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Motivation – Land use models  
 Spatial distribution of agents and activities in a city affects: 
 Travel demand  
 Energy consumption, pollution 
 Social welfare 
 
 Cities are complex systems: 
 Interaction of different markets 
 Many heterogeneous agents 
 Externalities  
 
 Land use models  allow to understand and forecast (?) the 
evolution of cities 
 
 Location choice models are a fundamental element of land use 
models 
 Microsimulation / agent based models are flexible and detailed, 
making possible to evaluate complex scenarios 
 
Motivation – Approaches to location choice modeling 
 Choice: agents (households and firms) select location of 
maximum utility as price takers 
 Most usual implemented approach in microsimulation 
 Requires prices/rents to be given (usually modeled with a 
hedonic price model and/or exogenous adjustments) 
 
 Bid-auction: real estate goods are traded in auctions 
where prices and locations are determined by the best 
bidders 
 Usually implemented in equilibrium models (bids are adjusted 
so everyone is located somewhere) 
 Prices are endogenous (expected maximum bid) 
 
 
Motivation – Bid-auction advantages 
 Real estate goods (housing, land) are quasi-unique and 
usually scarce  competition between agents 
 Explicit explanation of the price formation process (best bid 
in an auction) 
 Bid prices can be sensitive to scenarios of demand or supply 
surplus  
 Estimation: no price endogeneity (spatial autocorrelation) 
 
 But: 
 Estimates of bid function must reproduce both prices and location 
distribution 
 Bid-auction is not straightforward to implement in microsimulation 
framework 
 Detailed data is usually not available 
 
Bid-auction approach to location choice 
 Bhi : willingness to pay of agent h for location i. 
 
 
 
xh :  characteristics of agent h (household, firm, …) 
zi :  attributes of location i (housing unit, parcel of land, …) 
 
 
 Probability of agent h being the best bidder for a location i 
(Ellickson, 1981): 
 
 
 
 H: set of bidding agents 
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Bid-auction approach to location choice 
 Price or rent for one location:  
 Deterministic: bid of the winner of the auction 
 Stochastic: expected maximum bid 
 
 
 ri : rent/price of i = expected value of the maximum bid: 
 
 
 
  
H: set of bidding agents 
C: unknown constant 
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Estimation of bid-rent functions 
Estimation of bid-rent functions 
 Rosen (1974): Prices as a function of location attributes 
(hedonic rent model) 
 
 Ellickson (1981): stochastic bid approach, undetermined 
model  relative prices  
 
 Lerman & Kern (1983): bid approach + observed price is 
maximum bid absolute prices 
 Very detailed data is required (individual transaction prices) 
 Assumption: groups of homogeneous bidding agents 
 Validation only regarding rent and marginal willingness to pay for 
location attributes, not agent location distribution or price 
forecasting 
(Gross, 1988; Gross et al 1990; Gin and Sonstelie, 1992; McMillen 1996; Chattopadhyay 1998; 
Muto, 2006) 
Estimation of bid-rent functions 
 Idea: 
 Assume structural relationship between expected 
outcome of the auction and observed (average) prices 
 Estimate location choice model and price model 
simultaneously, using observed prices as indicators 
 
 Assumptions: 
 Auction price is a latent variable (the auction itself is a 
latent process) 
 All agents are potential bidders for all locations 
Model with price indicator 
Bid function 
(Bhi) 
Observed locations 
(choices) 
Explanatory 
variables (xh , zi) 
(latent) auction 
prices (ri) 
Observed prices 
 (Ri) 
Standard Logit choice model 
Auction price  
measurement 
model 
* Inspired by the Generalized Random Utility Model 
(Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002) 
Model with price indicator 
 Structural equation for prices: 
 
 
 
 Measurement equation for prices: 
 
        
           
 
 
 Likelihood: 
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Case study: Brussels 
 Data collected for a FP7 European Union project (SustainCity) 
 Census 2001 (aggregated information by zone) 
 Household survey 1999 (~1300 observations), no detail on housing attributes 
 Average transaction prices by commune and 2 types of dwelling (house or 
apartment) from 1985 to 2008 
 Other geographical, land use databases 
 
 1267997 households, 1274701 dwellings 
 157 communes 
 4975 zones 
 4 types of dwelling (with average attributes per zone) 
 Isolated house 
 Semi-isolated house 
 Joint house 
 Apartment 
Case study: Brussels 
 Bid function specification for location (bid) choice model (Ellickson): 
 
Case study: Brussels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Estimation performed with PythonBiogeme (Bierlaire and Fetiarison ,2010) 
 
Case study: Brussels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Estimation performed with PythonBiogeme (Bierlaire and Fetiarison ,2010) 
 
Case study: Brussels 
 Prices per commune and type (% error) (over estimation dataset) 
Case study: Brussels 
 Prices (over estimation dataset) 
Case study: Brussels 
 Prices (over estimation dataset) 
Case study: Brussels 
 Prices (over estimation dataset) 
Case study: Brussels (forecasting/validation) 
 Prices per commune and type (% error) (over full supply for 2001) 
Case study: Brussels (forecasting/validation) 
 Number of people per commune (% error) 
Case study: Brussels (forecasting/validation) 
 Number of people with univ degree per commune (% error) 
Case study: Brussels (forecasting/validation) 
 Number of households with 2+ cars (% error) 
Case study: Brussels (forecasting/validation) 
 Number of households with 0 cars (% error) 
Discussion 
 The proposed estimation method finds estimates that 
reproduce the location distribution of agents and the average 
market prices of dwellings better than other methods 
 
 Proposed method requires less detailed data  more suitable 
for extensive land use models 
 
 Well estimated bid functions (willingness to pay) allow to 
generate a good forecast of the transaction prices, without the 
need of hedonic price models  this helps if we want to 
microsimulate using a bid approach 
Bid-auction framework for 
microsimulation of location choice 
Microsimulation with a bid approach  
 When bids are simulated and we get: 
 Spatial distribution of agents 
 Real estate prices 
 
 But, in order to account for competition between 
agents for scarce goods, we need market clearing 
 
 Through hedonic price models (UrbanSim) 
 Simple but not real market clearing 
 
 Individual auctions (ILUTE) 
 Expensive in computational terms 
 
 Equilibrium (MUSSA) 
 Aggregated approach 
 
 
The market clearing problem 
Joint probability of household h occupying location i: 
 
 
 
Maximum bid probability 
 
Maximum surplus (utility) probability 
 
Selling probability 
 
Locating probability 
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Re-visiting Equilibrium 
 In equilibrium models it’s usually assumed that 
supply (S) equals demand (H)  
 
 Possible equilibrium conditions: 
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(everything is sold) 
(everyone is located) 
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Re-visiting Equilibrium 
 Market clearing can be achieved by imposing one of 
the equilibrium conditions and finding prices/bids 
that produce them 
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(prices clear the market) 
(bids clear the market) 
Due to interdependence, these are usually fixed point problems 
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Re-visiting Equilibrium 
 If we have an auction market and the best bidder 
rule is observed, adjusting prices or bids is 
equivalent in equilibrium 
 When market conditions change (supply, demand, 
etc) utility levels of the decision makers have to be 
adjusted, this is reflected in the level of the prices 
or bids 
 
   idea: quasi-equilibrium 
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Quasi-equilibrium  
 Periodical location of new and re-locating 
agents, given exogenous supply 
 Assumption: all households looking for a 
location are located somewhere  
 Total supply must be greater or equal than total 
demand 
 Not all locations are necessarily used 
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Quasi-equilibrium 
 No equilibrium   
 no perfect information (aggregate supply, 
previous prices) 
 No iterative negotiation/bidding 
 No absolute adjustment of bids/prices 
 Instead, adjustment of “perception” of agents 
that goes in the direction of an equilibrium 
but does not solve it. 
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Quasi-equilibrium 
 Algorithm (in each period): 
 All agents       observe the market: prices and supply 
 All gents (simultaneously) adjust their bids, attempting to 
make their expected number of winning auctions equal to 
one: 
 
 
 
 All agents bid at the same time for all locations  prices and 
location distributions are defined 
 The assignment mechanism is an auction  for each location 
a best bidder and a price is determined 
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Quasi-equilibrium 
 Bid function:  
 
 Perceived probability: 
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Advantage: no fixed point, just evaluation of equation  it is possible to apply to large populations 
without excessive computational cost 
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General framework 
37 
Firmographics 
Demographics 
New agents 
Supply model 
New real 
estate 
Market 
clearing 
Re-location 
models 
Located 
agents 
Real estate 
prices 
Transport model 
Externalities, market conditions 
(prices, demand/supply surplus, etc) 
Given for t=0 
Re-locating agents, 
vacated real estate 
t=t+1 
Travel times, 
congestion, level 
of service 
Market clearing 
Auction 
Externalities, prices 
and market 
conditions (t-1) 
Re-calculation of 
hedonic WP (Vh) 
Adjustment of 
utility level  
(bh) 
Transaction 
prices (Ri) 
Location 
probability 
distribution 
(Ph/i) 
Simulation of 
location choice 
Located 
individual 
agents and 
prices 
Supply (t) 
Demographics(t) 
Relocation 
t=t+1 
t=t+1 
New and Relocating agents 
Empty 
units 
Some preliminary results 
 Average prices per year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Average price growth: BID: 50%,  HEDONIC: 7% 
 Observed average prices per commune 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Average price growth :108% 
Advantages 
 Agents have an individual behavior but they relate to 
a “higher level” market mechanism through the 
utility level adjustment and the simultaneous auction. 
 Quasi-equilibrium :  
 Demand is not  cleared: utility adjustment does NOT 
assure allocation 
 Supply is  not cleared 
 System tends to equilibrium but does not clear 
 Adjustment of utility levels instead of prices allow to 
 Explain price formation (no need for hedonic price 
models)  
 Detect all agents utility levels, including those not active 
in the market, triggering future re-location 
41 
Thank you 
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Main assumptions of the general 
framework 
 Auction market 
 Agents adjust their utility level (individually in each period)  
 to ensure location (ex-ante expectations)  
 given market conditions: previous period rents, current supply 
 Time lag: 
 In production of real estate goods: 
 In perception of attributes of locations (non-instantaneous) 
 Simultaneous (macro level) bid of all agents for all locations 
 Location (best bidder) distributions and expected rents (Ri).  
 No iterative transactions.  
 Computationally simpler than transaction-specific price clearing 
 Microsimulation:  
 Actual allocation following macro distributions (simulation of auctions) 
 Rents at micro level (ri) 
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